We put forward a zero-knowledge based definition of privacy. Our notion is strictly stronger than the notion of differential privacy and is particularly attractive when modeling privacy in social networks. We furthermore demonstrate that it can be meaningfully achieved for tasks such as computing averages, fractions, histograms, and a variety of graph parameters and properties, such as average degree and distance to connectivity. Our results are obtained by establishing a connection between zero-knowledge privacy and sample complexity, and by leveraging recent sublinear time algorithms.
Introduction
Data privacy is a fundamental problem in today's information age. Enormous amounts of data are collected by government agencies, search engines, social networking systems, hospitals, financial institutions, and other organizations, and are stored in databases. There are huge social benefits in analyzing this data; however, it is important that sensitive information about individuals who have contributed to the data is not leaked to users analyzing the data. Thus, one of the main goals is to release statistical information about the population who have contributed to the data without breaching their individual privacy.
Many privacy definitions and schemes have been proposed in the past (see [CKLM09] and [FWCY10] for surveys). However, many of them have been shown to be insufficient by describing realistic attacks on such schemes (e.g., see [Kif09] ). The notion of differential privacy [DMNS06, Dwo06] , however, has remained strong and resilient to these attacks. Differential privacy requires that when one person's data is added or removed from the database, the output of the database access mechanism changes very little so that the output before and after the change are " -close" (where a specific notion of closeness of distributions is used). This notion has quickly become the standard notion of privacy, and mechanisms for releasing a variety of functions (including histogram queries, principal component analysis, learning, and many more (see [Dwo09] for a recent survey)) have been developed.
As we shall argue, however, although differential privacy provides a strong privacy guarantee, there are realistic social network settings where these guarantees might not be strong enough.
Roughly speaking, differential privacy says that whether you're in the database or not is inconsequential for your privacy (i.e., the output of the database mechanism is essentially the same). But this doesn't mean your privacy is protected; the information provided by your friends might already breach your privacy.
Alternatively, differential privacy can be rephrased as requiring that an adversary does not learn much more about an individual from the mechanism than what she could learn from knowing everyone else in the database (see the appendix of [DMNS06] for a formalization of this statement). Such a privacy guarantee is not sufficiently strong in the setting of social networks where an individual's friends are strongly correlated with the individual; in essence, "If I know your friends, I know you." (Indeed, a recent study [JM09] indicates that an individual's sexual orientation can be accurately predicted just by looking at the person's Facebook friends.) We now give a concrete example to illustrate how a differentially private mechanism can violate the privacy of individuals in a social network setting.
Example (Democrats vs. Republicans). Consider a social network of n people that are grouped into cliques of size 200. In each clique, either at least 80% of the people are Democrats, or at least 80% are Republicans. However, assume that the number of Democrats overall is roughly the same as the number of Republicans. Now, consider a mechanism that computes the proportion (in [0, 1]) of Democrats in each clique and adds just enough Laplacian noise to satisfy -differential privacy for a small , say = 0.1. For example, to achieve -differential privacy, it suffices to add Lap( [DMNS06] ). Since the mechanism satisfies -differential privacy for a small , one may think that it is safe to release such information without violating the privacy of any particular person. That is, the released data should not allow us to guess correctly with probability significantly greater than 1 2 whether a particular person is a Democrat or a Republican. However, this is not the case. With = 0.1, Lap( 1 200 ) is a small amount of noise, so with high probability, the data released will tell us the main political preference for any particular clique. An adversary that knows which clique a person is in will be able to correctly guess the political preference of that person with probability close to 80%.
For a more detailed explanation and analysis of the above example, see Appendix A.
Remark. In the above example, we assume that the graph structure of the social network is known and that the adversary can identify which clique an individual is in. Such information is commonly available: Graph structures of (anonymized) social networks are often released; these may include a predefined or natural clustering of the people (nodes) into cliques. Furthermore, an adversary may often also figure out the identity of various nodes in the graph (e.g., see [BDK07, HMJ + 08]); in fact, by participating in the social network before the anonymized graph is published, an adversary can even target specific individuals of his or her choice (see [BDK07] ).
Differential privacy says that the output of the mechanism does not depend much on any particular individual's data in the database. Thus, in the above example, a person has little reason not to truthfully report his political preference. However, this does not necessarily imply that the mechanism does not violate the person's privacy. In situations where a social network provides auxiliary information about an individual, that person's privacy can be violated even if he decides to not have his information included.
It is already known that differential privacy may not provide a strong enough privacy guarantee when an adversary has specific auxiliary information about an individual. For example, it was pointed out in [Dwo06] that if an adversary knows the auxiliary information "person A is two inches shorter than the average American woman", and if a differentially private mechanism accurately releases the average height of American women, then the adversary learns person A's height (which is assumed to be sensitive information in this example). In this example, the adversary has very specific auxiliary information about an individual that is usually hard to obtain. However, in the Democrats vs. Republicans example, the auxiliary information (the graph and clique structure) about individuals is more general and more easily accessible. Since social network settings contain large amounts of auxiliary information and correlation between individuals, differential privacy is usually not strong enough in such settings.
One may argue that there are versions of differential privacy that protect the privacy of groups of individuals, and that the mechanism in the Democrats vs. Republicans example does not satisfy these stronger definitions of privacy. While this is true, the main point here is that differential privacy will not protect the privacy of an individual, even though the definition is designed for individual privacy. Furthermore, even if we had used a differentially private mechanism that ensures privacy for groups of size 200 (i.e., the size of each clique), it might still be possible to deduce information about an individual by looking at the friends of the friends of the individual; this includes a significantly larger number of individuals. 2
Towards a Zero-Knowledge Definition of Privacy
In 1977, Dalenius [Dal77] stated a privacy goal for statistical databases: anything about an individual that can be learned from the database can also be learned without access to the database. This would be a very desirable notion of privacy. Unfortunately, Dwork and Naor [Dwo06, DN08] demonstrated a general impossibility result showing that a formalization of Dalenius's goal along the lines of semantic security for cryptosystems cannot be achieved, assuming that the database gives any non-trivial utility.
Our aim is to provide a privacy definition along the lines of Dalenius, and more precisely, relying on the notion of zero-knowledge from cryptography. In this context, the traditional notion of zeroknowledge says that an adversary gains essentially "zero additional knowledge" by accessing the mechanism. More precisely, whatever an adversary can compute by accessing the mechanism can essentially also be computed without accessing the mechanism. A mechanism satisfying this property would be private but utterly useless, since the mechanism provides essentially no information. The whole point of releasing data is to provide utility; thus, this extreme notion of zero-knowledge, which we now call "complete zero-knowledge", is not very applicable in this setting.
Intuitively, we want the mechanism to not release any additional information beyond some "aggregate information" that is considered acceptable to release. To capture this requirement, we use the notion of a "simulator" from zero-knowledge, and we require that a simulator with the acceptable aggregate information can essentially compute whatever an adversary can compute by accessing the mechanism. Our zero-knowledge privacy definition is thus stated relative to some class of algorithms providing acceptable aggregate information.
Aggregate Information
The question is how to define appropriate classes of aggregate information. We focus on the case where the aggregate information is any information that can be obtained from k random samples/rows (each of which corresponds to one individual's data) of the database, where the data of the person the adversary wants to attack has been concealed. The value of k can be carefully chosen so that the aggregate information obtained does not allow one to infer (much) information about the concealed data. The simulator is given this aggregate information and has to compute what the adversary essentially computes, even though the adversary has access to the mechanism. This ensures that the mechanism does not release any additional information beyond this "k random sample" aggregate information given to the simulator. Differential privacy can be described using our zero-knowledge privacy definition by considering simulators that are given aggregate information consisting of the data of all but one individual in the database; this is the same as aggregate information consisting of "k random samples" with k = n, where n is the number of rows in the database (recall that the data of the individual the adversary wants to attack is concealed), which we formally prove later. For k less than n, such as k = √ n, we obtain notions of privacy that are stronger than differential privacy. For example, we later show that the mechanism in the Democrats vs. Republicans example does not satisfy our zero-knowledge privacy definition when k = o(n) and n is sufficiently large.
We may also consider more general models of aggregate information that are specific to graphs representing social networks; in this context we focus on random samples with some exploration of the neighborhood of each sample.
Our Results
We consider two different settings for releasing information. In the first setting, we consider statistical (row) databases in a setting where an adversary might have auxiliary information, such as from a social network, and we focus on releasing traditional statistics (e.g., averages, fractions, histograms, etc.) from a database. As explained earlier, differential privacy may not be strong enough in such a setting, so we use our zero-knowledge privacy definition instead. In the second setting, we consider graphs with personal data that represent social networks, and we focus on releasing information directly related to a social network, such as properties of the graph structure.
Setting #1. Computing functions on databases with zero-knowledge privacy: In this setting, we focus on computing functions mapping databases to R m . We give a characterization of the functions that can be released with zero-knowledge privacy in terms of their sample complexity-i.e., how accurate the function can be approximated using random samples from the input database. More precisely, functions with low sample complexity can be computed accurately by a zero-knowledge private mechanism, and vice versa. (It is already known that functions with low sample complexity can be computed with differential privacy (see [DMNS06] ), but here we show that the stronger notion of zero-knowledge privacy can be achieved.) In this result, the zeroknowledge private mechanism we construct simply adds Laplacian noise appropriately calibrated to the sample complexity of the function.
Many common queries on statistical databases have low sample complexity, including averages, fraction queries, counting queries, and coarse histogram queries. (In general, it would seem that any "meaningful" query function for statistical databases should have relatively low sample complexity if we think of the rows of the database as random samples from some large underlying population.) We also show that for functions with low sample complexity, we can use differentially private mechanisms to construct zero-knowledge private mechanisms. Using this result, we construct zeroknowledge private mechanisms for such functions while providing decent utility guarantees. All of these results can be found in Section 3.
We also consider mechanisms that answer a class of queries simultaneously, and we generalize the notion of sample complexity to classes of query functions. By showing that a class of fraction queries with low VC dimension has low sample complexity, we are able to use existing differentially private mechanisms for classes of fraction queries to construct zero-knowledge private mechanisms, resulting in improved accuracy for fraction queries. These results can be found in Section 4. Setting #2. Releasing graph structure information with zero-knowledge privacy: In this setting, we consider a graph representing a social network, and we focus on privately releasing information about the structure of the graph. We use our zero-knowledge privacy definition, since the released information can be combined with auxiliary information such as an adversary's knowledge and/or previously released data (e.g., graph structure information) to breach the privacy of individuals.
The connection between sample complexity and zero-knowledge privacy highlights an interesting connection between sublinear time algorithms and privacy. As it turns out, many of the recently developed sublinear algorithms on graphs proceed by picking random samples (vertices) and performing some local exploration; we are able to leverage these algorithms to privately release graph structure information, such as average degree and distance to properties such as connectivity and cycle-freeness. We discuss these results in Section 5.
2 Zero-Knowledge Privacy
Definitions
Let D be the collection of all databases whose rows are elements (e.g., tuples) from some data universe X. For convenience, we will assume that X contains an element ⊥, which can be used to conceal the true value of a row. Given a database D, let |D| denote the number of rows in D. For any integer n, let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}. For any database D ∈ D, any integer i ∈ [|D|], and any element v ∈ X, let (D −i , v) denote the database D with row i replaced by the element v.
In this paper, mechanisms, adversaries, and simulators are simply randomized algorithms that play certain roles in our definitions. Let San be a mechanism that operates on databases in D. For any database D ∈ D, any adversary A, and any z ∈ {0, 1} * , let Out A (A(z) ↔ San(D)) denote the random variable representing the output of A on input z after interacting with the mechanism San operating on the database D. Note that San can be interactive or non-interactive. If San is non-interactive, then San(D) sends information (e.g., a sanitized database) to A and then halts immediately; the adversary A then tries to breach the privacy of some individual in the database D.
Let agg be any class of randomized algorithms that provide aggregate information to simulators, as described in Section 1.1.1. We refer to agg as a model of aggregate information. Definition 1. We say that San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to agg if there exists a T ∈ agg such that for every adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that for every database D ∈ X n , every z ∈ {0, 1} * , every integer i ∈ [n], and every W ⊆ {0, 1} * , the following hold:
The probabilities are over the random coins of San and A, and T and S, respectively. Intuitively, the above definition says that whatever an adversary can compute by accessing the mechanism can essentially also be computed without accessing the mechanism but with certain aggregate information (specified by agg). The adversary in the latter scenario is represented by the simulator S. The definition requires that the adversary's output distribution is close to that of the simulator. This ensures that the mechanism essentially does not release any additional information beyond what is allowed by agg. When the algorithm T provides aggregate information to the simulator S, the data of individual i is concealed so that the aggregate information does not depend directly on individual i's data. However, in the setting of social networks, the aggregate information may still depend on people's data that are correlated with individual i in reality, such as the data of individual i's friends. Thus, the role played by agg is very important in the context of social networks.
To measure the closeness of the adversary's output and the simulator's output, we use the same closeness measure as in differential privacy (as opposed to, say, statistical difference) for the same reasons. As explained in [DMNS06] , consider a mechanism that outputs the contents of a randomly chosen row. Suppose agg is defined so that it includes the algorithm that simply outputs its input (D −i , ⊥) to the simulator (which is the case of differential privacy; see Section 1.1.1 and 2.2). Then, a simulator can also choose a random row and then simulate the adversary with the chosen row sent to the simulated adversary. The real adversary's output will be very close to the simulator's output in statistical difference (1/n to be precise); however, it is clear that the mechanism always leaks private information about some individual.
Remark. Our -zero-knowledge privacy definition can be easily extended to ( , δ)-zero-knowledge privacy, where we also allow an additive error of δ on the RHS of the inequalities. We can further extend our definition to (c, , δ)-zero-knowledge privacy to protect the privacy of any group of c individuals simultaneously. To obtain this more general definition, we would change "i ∈ [n]" to "I ⊆ [n] with 1 ≤ |I| ≤ c", and "S(z, (D −i , ⊥), i, n)" to "S(z, (D −I , ⊥), I, n)", where (D −I , ⊥) denotes the database D with the rows at positions I replaced by ⊥. We use this more general definition when we consider group privacy.
Remark. In our zero-knowledge privacy definition, we consider computationally unbounded simulators. We can also consider PPT simulators by requiring that the mechanism San and the adversary A are PPT algorithms, and agg is a class of PPT algorithms. All of these algorithms would be PPT in n, the size of the database. With minor modifications, the results of this paper would still hold in this case.
The choice of agg determines the type and amount of aggregate information given to the simulator, and should be decided based on the context in which the zero-knowledge privacy definition is used. The aggregate information should not depend much on data that is highly correlated with the data of a single person, since such aggregate information may be used to breach the privacy of that person. For example, in the context of social networks, such aggregate information should not depend much on any person and the people closely connected to that person, such as his or her friends. By choosing agg carefully, we ensure that the mechanism essentially does not release any additional information beyond what is considered acceptable. We first consider the model of aggregate information where T in the definition of zero-knowledge privacy chooses k(n) random samples. Let k : N → N be any function.
• RS(k(·)) = k(·) random samples: the class of algorithms T such that on input a database D ∈ X n , T chooses k(n) random samples (rows) from D uniformly without replacement, and then performs any computation on these samples without reading any of the other rows of D.
Note that with such samples, T can emulate choosing k(n) random samples with replacement, or a combination of without replacement and with replacement.
k(n) should be carefully chosen so that the aggregate information obtained does not allow one to infer (much) information about the concealed data. For k(n) = 0, the simulator is given no aggregate information at all, which is the case of complete zero-knowledge. For k(n) = n, the simulator is given all the rows of the original database except for the target individual i, which is the case of differential privacy (as we prove later). For k(n) strictly in between 0 and n, we obtain notions of privacy that are stronger than differential privacy. For example, one can consider k(n) = o(n), such as k(n) = √ n. In the setting of a social network, k(n) can be chosen so that when k(n) random samples are chosen from (D −i , ⊥), with very high probability, for (almost) all individuals j, very few of the k(n) chosen samples will be in individual j's local neighborhood in the social network graph. This way, the aggregate information released by the mechanism depends very little on data that is highly correlated with the data of a single individual. The choice of k(n) would depend on various properties of the graph structure, such as clustering coefficient, edge density, and degree distribution. The choice of k(n) would also depend on the amount of correlation between the data of adjacent or close vertices (individuals) in the graph, and the type of information released by the mechanism. In this model of aggregate information, vertices (individuals) in the graph with more adjacent vertices (e.g., representing friends) may have less privacy than those with fewer adjacent vertices. However, this is often the case in social networks, where having more links/connections to other people may result in less privacy.
One can also consider other models of aggregate information, such as the class of algorithms T such that on input a database D ∈ X n , T reads each row with at most a certain probability, say
n . This class of algorithms, which we call "k(·) adaptive samples" and denote by AS(k(·)), is more general and contains RS(k(·)). However, there are some "bad" mechanisms that are zeroknowledge private with respect to AS(k(·)) but intuitively violate the privacy of individuals. We now give an example of such a mechanism.
Example. Recall the Democrats vs. Republicans example in the introduction. Now, consider a new mechanism that chooses a clique uniformly at random, computes the proportion of Democrats in the chosen clique, adds Lap( 1 200 ) noise to the computed proportion, and then outputs the clique number/identifier and the noisy proportion. For the same reasons as in the Democrats vs. Republicans example, this mechanism clearly violates the privacy of the individuals in the chosen clique. However, this mechanism is still -zero-knowledge private with respect to AS(k(·)) as long as k(n) isn't too small.
Intuitively, a simulator with T ∈ AS(k(·)) providing aggregate information can simulate the mechanism by doing the same thing the mechanism does, since the mechanism reads each row with probability n , since T is only allowed to read each row with probability at most k(n) n . We assume that T can easily determine which rows belong to a particular clique; for example, the rows of the database can be ordered so that individuals belonging to the same clique appear consecutively in the database, or the nodes in the published social network graph can have distinct labels in {1, . . . , n}, and the political preference for node i is stored in row i of the database.
In Section 5, we consider other models of aggregate information that take more into consideration the graph structure of a social network. Note that zero-knowledge privacy does not necessarily guarantee that the privacy of every individual is completely protected. Zero-knowledge privacy is defined with respect to a model of aggregate information, and such aggregate information may still leak some sensitive information about an individual in certain scenarios.
Composition: Just as for differentially private mechanisms, mechanisms that are -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) also compose nicely.
Proposition 2. Suppose San 1 is 1 -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k 1 (·)) and San 2 is 2 -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k 2 (·)). Then, the mechanism San obtained by (sequentially) composing San 1 with San 2 is ( 1 + 2 )-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS((k 1 + k 2 )(·)).
Proof. Let k(n) = k 1 (n) + k 2 (n), and let T 1 ∈ RS(k 1 (·)) and T 2 ∈ RS(k 2 (·)) be the aggregate information algorithms guaranteed by the zero-knowledge privacy of San 1 and San 2 , respectively. Let T be an algorithm in RS(k(·)) that, on input a database D ∈ X n , chooses k 1 (n) random samples as in T 1 , chooses k 2 (n) random samples as in T 2 , runs T 1 and T 2 on D separately using the chosen samples, and then outputs (T 1 (D), T 2 (D)). Let A be any adversary. It is easy to decompose A into two adversaries A 1 and A 2 , where A j is the part of A that interacts with San j . The output of A 1 contains information describing the state (including the work tape) of A after finishing its interaction with San 1 . A 2 expects its input z to be the output of A 1 so that it can start interacting with San 2 with the same information A would have at this point of the interaction. Let S j be the (guaranteed) simulator for San j and A j .
Let S be a simulator that, on input (z,
Group Privacy: A nice feature of differential privacy is that -differential privacy implies (c, c )-differential privacy for groups of size c (see [Dwo06] and the appendix in [DMNS06] ). We have a similar group privacy guarantee for -zero-knowledge privacy.
Proposition 3. Suppose San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to agg. Then, for every c ≥ 1, San is also (c, (2c − 1) )-zero-knowledge private with respect to agg.
Proof. Let T be the algorithm in agg guaranteed by the -zero-knowledge privacy of San. Let c ≥ 1. Consider any adversary A, and let S be the simulator for A and San. Let D ∈ X n , z ∈ {0, 1} * , I ⊆ [n] with 1 ≤ |I| ≤ c, and W ⊆ {0, 1} * . Let i be any integer in I. Then, by the -zero-knowledge privacy of San, we have
We later show that -zero-knowledge privacy implies 2 -differential privacy (Proposition 7), so San is 2 -differentially private and thus (c − 1, 2(c − 1) )-differentially private. As a result, we have
Combining (1) and (2) from above, we get
It can be easily shown that ( , δ)-differential privacy implies (0, e −1+δ)-differential privacy (see [DKM + 06] or Section 2.2 for the definition of ( , δ)-differential privacy), which implies (c, 0, c(e − 1 + δ))-differential privacy for groups of size c. We have a similar group privacy guarantee for ( , δ)-zero-knowledge privacy.
For agg = RS(k(·)), we also have the following group privacy guarantee for ( , δ)-zero-knowledge privacy.
Proposition 5. Suppose San is ( , δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)). Then, for every c ≥ 1, San is also (c, , δ + e (c − 1) k(n) n )-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)). Intuitively, for k(n) sufficiently smaller than n, ( , δ)-zero-knowledge privacy with respect to RS(k(·)) actually implies some notion of group privacy, since the algorithm T (in the privacy definition) chooses each row with probability k(n)/n. Thus, T chooses any row of a fixed group of c rows with probability at most ck(n)/n. If this probability is very small, then the output of T and thus the simulator S does not depend much on any group of c rows.
Proof. Fix c ≥ 1. Since San is ( , δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)), there exists a T ∈ RS(k(·)) such that for every adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that for every D ∈ X n , z ∈ {0, 1} * , i ∈ [n], and W ⊆ {0, 1} * , we have
Let A be any adversary, and let S be the simulator guaranteed by the zero-knowledge privacy of San. Let S be a simulator that, on input (z,
with 1 ≤ |I| ≤ c, and W ⊆ {0, 1} * . Let i be the smallest integer in I.
Let E be the event that T reads a row at any of the positions specified by I \ {i} (the input of T is inferred from context). We note that conditioned on E, T (D −i , ⊥) and
We also have
Differential Privacy vs. Zero-Knowledge Privacy
In this section, we compare differential privacy to our zero-knowledge privacy definition. We first state the definition of differential privacy in a form similar to our zero-knowledge privacy definition in order to more easily compare the two. For any pair of databases D, D ∈ X n , let H(D, D ) denote the number of rows in which D and D differ, comparing row-wise.
Definition 6. We say that San is -differentially private if for every adversary A, every z ∈ {0, 1} * , every pair of databases D, D ∈ X n with H(D, D ) ≤ 1, and every W ⊆ {0, 1} * , we have
where the probabilities are over the random coins of San and A. For (c, )-differential privacy (for groups of size c),
we allow an additive error of δ on the RHS of the inequality in the definition.
Proposition 7. Suppose San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to any class agg. Then, San is 2 -differentially private.
Proof. Let A be any adversary, let z ∈ {0, 1} * , let D , D ∈ X n with H(D , D ) ≤ 1, and let
Since San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to agg, there exists a T ∈ agg and a simulator S such that for every database D ∈ X n , we have
Proposition 8. Suppose San is -differentially private. Then, San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(n).
Proof. Let T be an algorithm in RS(n) that, on input a database D ∈ X n , chooses n "random" samples from D without replacement (i.e., chooses all the rows of the database), and then outputs the whole database D . Let A be any adversary. Let S be the simulator that, on input (z, (D −i , ⊥), i, n), simulates the interaction between A(z) and San(D −i , ⊥), and outputs whatever A outputs in the simulated interaction. Thus, we have
, and W ⊆ {0, 1} * . Since San is -differentially private and
Remark. If we consider PPT simulators in the definition of zero-knowledge privacy instead of computationally unbounded simulators, then we require San in Proposition 8 to be PPT as well.
Combining Propositions 7 and 8, we see that our zero-knowledge privacy definition includes differential privacy as a special case (up to a factor of 2 for ).
Revisiting the Democrats vs. Republicans Example
Recall the Democrats vs. Republicans example in the introduction. The mechanism in the example is -differentially private for some small , even though the privacy of individuals is clearly violated. However, the mechanism is not zero-knowledge private in general. Suppose that the people's political preferences are stored in a database D ∈ X n . Proposition 9. Fix > 0, c ≥ 1, and any function k(·) such that k(n) = o(n). Let San be a mechanism that on input D ∈ X n computes the proportion of Democrats in each clique and adds Lap( c 200 ) noise to each proportion independently. Then, San is (c, )-differentially private, but for every constant > 0 and every sufficiently large n, San is not -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Intuitively, San is not -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) because for sufficiently large n, an adversary having only k(n) = o(n) random samples would not have any samples in many of the cliques, so the adversary would know nothing about many of the cliques. Therefore, the adversary does gain knowledge by accessing the mechanism, which gives some information about every clique since the amount of noise added to each clique is constant.
Proof. We note that when a single person changes his or her political preference, the vector of proportions of Democrats changes by 1 200 in L 1 distance. Thus, by Proposition 1 in [DMNS06] , San is ( /c)-differentially private, which implies that San is (c, )-differential private (see [Dwo06] and the appendix in [DMNS06] ), as required.
Let > 0. Let A be the adversary that simply outputs whatever the mechanism releases. To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists a T ∈ RS(k(·)) and a simulator S for A satisfying the required condition in the definition of -zero-knowledge privacy. Recall that there are 200 people in each clique. Let λ = c 200 , let K ≥ 600 λ be a constant such that 200 divides K, and let n ≥ K such that 200 divides n. Let W = (R ≤0 ) K/200 × R n/200−K/200 , and let z ∈ {0, 1} * . Then, for every D ∈ X n , we have
Without loss of generality, suppose that the rows of a database in X n are ordered so that the first 200 rows correspond to 200 people in the same clique, and the next 200 rows correspond to 200 people in the same clique, and so on. Let D 1 be the database (0, . . . , 0) of size n, and let D 2 be the database (1 K , 0, . . . , 0) of size n, where 1 K = (1, . . . , 1) is of size K. Let X 1 , . . . , X n/200 ∼ Lap(λ) (independently), and let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n/200 ). Now, observe the following:
where F λ (x) = 1 2 e x/λ is the cumulative distribution function of Lap(λ) for x ≤ 0. Let E K denote the event that T does not read any of the first K rows of its input (the input of T is inferred from context). Now, observe that
Since ln is continuous and
] for all n, we have that for sufficiently large n,
Thus, for sufficiently large n, we have ln
2 , which contradicts (1) above.
Remark. In the Democrats vs. Republicans example, even if San adds Lap( 1 ) noise to achieve (200, )-differential privacy so that the privacy of each clique (and thus each person) is protected, the mechanism would still fail to be -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) for any constant > 0 when n is sufficiently large (see Proposition 9). Thus, zero-knowledge privacy with respect to RS(k(·)) with k(n) = o(n) seems to provide an unnecessarily strong privacy guarantee in this particular example. However, this is mainly because the clique size is fixed and known to be 200, and we have assumed that the only correlation between people's political preferences that exists is within a clique. In a more realistic social network, there would be cliques of various sizes, and the correlation between people's data would be more complicated. For example, an adversary knowing your friends' friends may still be able to infer a lot of information about you.
Characterizing Zero-Knowledge Privacy
In this section, we focus on constructing zero-knowledge private mechanisms that compute a function mapping databases in X n to R m , and we characterize the set of functions that can be computed with zero-knowledge privacy. These are precisely the functions with low sample complexity, i.e., can be approximated (accurately) using only limited information from the database, such as k random samples.
We quantify the error in approximating a function g :
Let C be any class of randomized algorithms.
Definition 10. A function g : X n → R m is said to have (δ, β)-sample complexity with respect to C if there exists an algorithm T ∈ C such that for every database D ∈ X n , we have T (D) ∈ R m and
T is said to be a (δ, β)-sampler for g with respect to C.
Remark. If we consider PPT simulators in the definition of zero-knowledge privacy instead of computationally unbounded simulators, then we would require here that C is a class of PPT algorithms (PPT in n, the size of the database). Thus, in the definition of (δ, β)-sample complexity, we would consider a family of functions (one for each value of n) that can be computed in PPT, and the sampler T would be PPT in n.
It was shown in [DMNS06] that functions with low sample complexity with respect to RS(k(·)) have low sensitivity as well.
Lemma 11 ([DMNS06]
). Suppose g : X n → R m has (δ, β)-sample complexity with respect to RS(k(·)) for some β <
As mentioned in [DMNS06] , the converse of the above lemma is not true, i.e., not all functions with low sensitivity have low sample complexity (see [DMNS06] for an example). This should be no surprise, since functions with low sensitivity have accurate differentially private mechanisms, while functions with low sample complexity have accurate zero-knowledge private mechanisms. We already know that zero-knowledge privacy is stronger than differential privacy, as illustrated by the Democrats vs. Republicans example.
We now state how the sample complexity of a function is related to the amount of noise a mechanism needs to add to the function value in order to achieve a certain level of zero-knowledge privacy. Intuitively, San should be zero-knowledge private because a simulator can simulate San by first approximating g(D) by running a sampler T ∈ C for g, and then adding the same amount of noise as San; the error in approximating g(D) is blurred by the added noise so that the simulator's output distribution is close to San's output distribution.
Proof. Let T be a (δ, β)-sampler for g with respect to C. Let A be any adversary. Let S be a simulator that, on input (z, . . . , X m ), which we will denote using the random variable S (z, T (D −i , ⊥), i, n). S then simulates the computation of A(z) with S (z, T (D −i , ⊥), i, n) sent to A as a message, and outputs whatever A outputs.
Since ||g(D) − x|| 1 ≤ (b − a)m always holds, we also have
Since T is a (δ,
Thus, using (1) and (2) above, we have
Now, using (1) and (2) again, we also have
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the function f (x) = x −1 is convex for x > 0. Then, for every s ∈ R n , we have
Thus, for every W ⊆ {0, 1} * , we have ln Proof. This follows from combining Proposition 12 and Lemma 11.
Using Proposition 12, we can recover the basic mechanism in [DMNS06] that is -differentially private.
is -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(n).
Proof. We note that every function g : X n → R m has (0, 0)-sample complexity with respect to RS(n). The corollary follows by applying Proposition 12.
We now show how the zero-knowledge privacy and utility properties of a mechanism computing a function is related to the sample complexity of the function. A class of algorithms agg is said to be closed under postprocessing if for any T ∈ agg and any algorithm M , the composition of M and T (i.e., the algorithm that first runs T on the input and then runs M on the output of T ) is also in agg. We note that RS(k(·)) is closed under postprocessing.
Proposition 15. Let agg be any class of algorithms that is closed under postprocessing, and suppose a function g : X n → R m has a mechanism San such that the following hold:
• Privacy: San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to agg.
Then, g has (δ,
)-sample complexity with respect to agg.
The intuition is that the zero-knowledge privacy of San guarantees that San can be simulated by a simulator S that is given aggregate information provided by some algorithm T ∈ agg. Thus, an algorithm that runs T and then S will be able to approximate g with accuracy similar to that of San.
Proof. Let A be an adversary that simply outputs whatever San releases. Since San is -zeroknowledge private with respect to agg, there exists a B ∈ agg and a simulator S such that for every D ∈ X n , z ∈ {0, 1} * , and t ∈ {0, 1} * , we have
Fix z ∈ {0, 1} * . Let T be an algorithm that, on input D ∈ X n , first runs B on (D −1 , ⊥), then runs S on (z, B(D −1 , ⊥), 1, n), and then outputs S(z, B(D −1 , ⊥), 1, n). Since B ∈ agg, S is an algorithm, and agg is closed under postprocessing, we have that T is in agg. Let D ∈ X n . We have
where the first inequality is due to (1). Thus, T is a (δ,
β+(e −1) e )-sampler for g with respect to agg.
Simple Examples of Zero-Knowledge Private Mechanisms
In this section, we show how to construct some simple examples of zero-knowledge private mechanisms with respect to RS(k(·)). = ln(e + 2e 1/n+k −1/3 −2k 1/3 ) ≤ ln(e + 2e −k 1/3 ) ≤ + 2e −k 1/3 . Thus, we have the following result:
• By adding Lap(
, San is ( + 2e −k 1/3 )-zeroknowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Our example mechanism for computing averages comes from the general connection between sample complexity and zero-knowledge privacy (Proposition 12), which holds for any model agg of aggregate information. For computing averages, we can actually construct a mechanism with better utility by choosing k(n) random samples without replacement from the input database D ∈ X n and then running a differentially private mechanism on the chosen samples. We will show that such a mechanism is zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) and has even better privacy parameters than the differentially private mechanism, due to the initial sampling step.
In general, this "Sample and DP-Sanitize" method works for query functions that can be approximated using random samples (e.g., averages, fractions, and histograms), and allows us to convert differentially private mechanisms to zero-knowledge private mechanisms with respect to RS(k(·)). We now show what privacy guarantees are obtained by the Sample and DP-Sanitize method.
Proposition 16 (Sample and DP-Sanitize). Let San DP be any ( , δ)-differentially private mechanism. Let San be any mechanism that, on input D ∈ X n , chooses k = k(n) random samples without replacement, runs San DP on the chosen samples, and then performs any computation on the output of San DP without reading the input database D again. Then, the following hold:
• San is ( , δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
• San is (2 ln(1 + k n (e − 1)), (2 + k n (e − 1)) k n δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Intuitively, San is zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) because San DP is differentially private and is only run on k random samples; also, San has better privacy parameters than those of San DP because of the extra noise added from choosing only k random samples.
Proof. We observe that the mechanism San itself is in RS(k(·)). Thus, let T = San. Let n ≥ 1, D ∈ X n , and i ∈ [n].
We first show that San is ( , δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)). Consider San(D) and T (D −i , ⊥) = San(D −i , ⊥). We note that San(D) and San(D −i , ⊥) have the same output distribution when both San's choose the same k random samples and the samples do not contain row i. When both San's choose the same k random samples and the samples do contain row i, the two databases formed by the chosen samples of the two San's (respectively) will differ in exactly one row. Since both San's run an ( , δ)-differentially private mechanism, namely San DP , on the chosen samples, and since San does not use the original input database in its computation afterwards, it is easy to see that the output distribution of the two San's satisfy the closeness condition in the ( , δ)-zero-knowledge privacy definition. Since the simulator S in the privacy definition gets T (D −i , ⊥) = San(D −i , ⊥) as one of its inputs, it is easy to show that San is ( , δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
We now show that San is (2 ln(1 + k n (e − 1)), (2 + k n (e − 1)) k n δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)). If k = n, then this follows from the fact that San is ( , δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)). Thus, we now assume that k ≤ n − 1. We will show that San(D) and . Let W ⊆ {0, 1} * , and let E be the event that row i is chosen when San chooses k random samples. Observe that
where the second last inequality follows from the fact that the function f (x) = 1 x is convex for x > 0. Thus, we have the following:
Using the same argument as above but with (D −i , ⊥) in place of D, we get the following:
Combining the results above and noting that Pr[E] = k n , we have the following:
It easily follows that San is (2 ln(1 + k n (e − 1)), (2 + k n (e − 1)) k n δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)). Now, suppose that ≤ 1. Then, one can easily verify that e − 1 ≤ 2 , so 1 + k n (e − 1) ≤ e 2k n and 2 + k n (e − 1) ≤ 4. Thus, San is ( 4k n , 4k n δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
We now use the Sample and DP-Sanitize method (Proposition 16) to construct some zeroknowledge private mechanisms.
In the examples below, let n ≥ 1, k = k(n), and , β ∈ (0, 1]. If D ∈ X n is a database, let D be a random variable representing a database formed by choosing k random samples from D uniformly without replacement.
Example (Improved Accuracy for Averages). Let X = [0, 1], and let avg(
n -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Also, by Hoeffding's inequality (which still holds when the sampling is done without replacement as opposed to with replacement (e.g., see [Hoe63] This mechanism is usually more accurate than the mechanism in the earlier example for averages, which adds at least Lap( 1 k 1/3 ) noise and thus is accurate to within an additive error of 1 k 1/3 ln( 2 β ) with probability at most 1 − β.
Example (Fraction Queries: Fraction of rows satisfying some property P ). Let P : X → {0, 1} be the predicate representing some property of a row. Let f rac
, which is the fraction of rows satisfying property P . Since f rac P (D) can be viewed as the average of the numbers {P (D i )} n i=1 , we can get the same result as in the example for averages:
to within an additive error of
) with probability at least 1 − β, and is 4k n -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Example (Counting Queries: Number of rows satisfying some property P ). Let P : X → {0, 1} be the predicate representing some property of a row. Let count(D) = n i=1 P (D i ), which is the number of rows satisfying property P . Since g(D) is simply a fraction query but scaled by a factor of n, we can get the same result as in the example for fraction queries except that the error is scaled by a factor of n:
to within an additive error of We can construct a zero-knowledge private mechanism (with respect to RS(k(·))) that computes the histogram with respect to the bins B 1 , . . . , B m , by composing San i for i = 1, . . . , m, where San i is any zero-knowledge private mechanism (with respect to RS( 1 m k(·))) for estimating the number of rows in the i th bin, and then applying our composition result (Propsition 2). Using our mechanism for counting queries, we can define San i so that it approximates the number of rows in the i th bin to within an additive error of . Then, applying the union bound and our composition result (Propsition 2), we get the following result:
Answering a Class of Queries Simultaneously
In this section, we consider mechanisms that answer a class of query functions simultaneously. We generalize the notion of sample complexity (with respect to RS(k(·))) to classes of query functions and show a connection between differential privacy and zero-knowledge privacy for any class of query functions with low sample complexity. In particular, we show that for any class Q of query functions that can be approximated simultaneously using random samples, any differentially private mechanism that is "useful" for Q can be converted to a zero-knowledge private mechanism that is useful for Q, similar to the Sample and DP-Sanitize method. We also show that any class of fraction queries with low VC dimension can be approximated simultaneously using random samples, so we can use existing differentially private mechanisms (e.g., the ones in [BLR08] and [DRV10] ) to obtain zero-knowledge private mechanisms for any class of fraction queries with low VC dimension.
Let X * denote the set of all databases whose rows are elements from the data universe X. In this section, a query is a function from X * to R m for some m.
In this section, we consider mechanisms that answer a class Q of queries simulataneously by outputting a "synopsis" (e.g., a synthetic database) that allows us to answer all the queries in Q. A synopsis is a pair ( D, R), where D is any data structure (containing data), and R is a description of any deterministic "query-answering" algorithm that, on input a data structure D and a query q : X * → R m , answers the query by reading D and outputting some vector in R m .
Let R DB be the usual query-answering algorithm for databases that, on input a database D ∈ X * and a query q : X * → R m , answers with q(D). If D is a database, then (D, R DB ) is an example of a synopsis. If D is a database obtained by choosing k random samples from D, then another example of a synopsis is ( D, R D ) , where R D is a query-answering algorithm that approximates a given counting query q on the larger database D by computing q( D) and then scaling the answer by |D| k (to compensate for the fact that D contained only k random samples from D).
Let Q be any class of queries that map databases in X * to vectors in R m for some m. We now define what it means for two synopses to be close to one another with respect to Q. Intuitively, two synopses are α-close to one another with respect to Q if they are "α-indistinguishable" by Q, i.e., no query in Q can be used to distinguish the two synopses by more than α. Thus, if two synopses are close to one another with respect to Q, then we can use one synopsis to approximate the other synopsis's answers to queries in Q. We want to construct mechanisms that, on input a database D, outputs a synopsis that is close to the synopsis (D, R DB ), so that we can use the synopsis to accurately answer queries in Q on the database D. We define the usefulness/utility of a mechanism from this perspective of closeness of synopses.
Definition 18. A mechanism San is (α, β)-useful with respect to Q for databases of size n if for every input database D ∈ X n , with probability at least 1 − β (over the random coins of San), San(D) outputs a synopsis ( D, R) that is α-close to (D, R DB ) with respect to Q.
We now generalize the notion of sample complexity with respect to RS(k(·)) to classes of query functions. Intuitively, a class Q of queries has low sample complexity if the queries can be approximated simultaneously using k random samples from the input database.
Definition 19. A class Q of queries is said to have (k, α, β)-sample complexity for databases of size n with converter f : Q × R m → R m if for every database D ∈ X n , if we choose k random samples from the database D without replacement and form a database D consisting of the chosen samples, then with probability at least 1 − β, we have sup
The converter f in the above definition is used to convert the answer to a query q on the database D to an answer to the same query q on the original database D. When Q is a class of queries computing averages or the fraction of rows satisfying some predicate, f would normally be the function f (q, x) = x. When Q is a class of queries computing sums, f would normally be the function f (q, x) = n k x, since the database D consists of only k random samples from the original database D, which has n rows.
We now show that for any class Q of queries with low sample complexity, we can convert any useful differentially private mechanism to a useful zero-knowledge private mechanism (with respect to RS(k(·))).
Proposition 20. Let n ≥ 1, k = k(n). Suppose a class Q of queries has (k, α 1 , β 1 )-sample complexity for databases of size n with a converter f : Q×X m → X m such that ||f (q, x)−f (q, y)|| 1 ≤ L||x − y|| 1 for every x, y ∈ R m , q ∈ Q, where L is a non-negative real constant. Let ∈ (0, 1], and let San DP be any ( , δ)-differentially private mechanism that is (α 2 , β 2 )-useful with respect to Q for databases of size k.
Then, using San DP , we can construct a mechanism San ZK that is ( 4k n , 4k n δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) and is (α 1 + Lα 2 , β 1 + β 2 )-useful with respect to Q for databases of size n.
Proof. Let San ZK be the mechanism that, on input a database D ∈ X n , first chooses k random samples without replacement from D, and then forms the database D using the samples. Then, San ZK runs the mechanism San DP on D to get a synopsis ( D, R) that is α-close to ( D, R DB ) with respect to Q. Then, San ZK outputs the synopsis ( D, R ), where R is the algorithm that, on input the data structure D and a query q, first runs R on ( D, q), then converts the answer R( D, q) to an answer on the original database D by computing f (q, R( D, q)), and then outputs f (q, R( D, q)).
By Proposition 16, San ZK is ( 4k n , 4k n δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)). We now show that San ZK is (α 1 + Lα 2 , β 1 + β 2 )-useful with respect to Q for databases of size n. Let D ∈ X n . Since Q has (k, α 1 , β 1 )-sample complexity for databases of size n with the converter f , we have that with probability at least 1 − β 1 , San ZK (D) forms a database D ∈ X k such that sup q∈Q ||q(D)−f (q, q( D))|| 1 ≤ α 1 . Since San DP is (α 2 , β 2 )-useful with respect to Q for databases of size k, we also have that for every database D ∈ X k , with probability at least 1−β 2 , the mechanism
Thus, with probability at least 1−(β 1 +β 2 ), the synopsis ( D, R ) that San ZK (D) outputs satisfies
Thus, with probability at least 1 − (β 1 + β 2 ), San ZK outputs a synopsis ( D, R ) that is (α 1 + Lα 2 )-close to (D, R DB ) with respect to Q, as required.
Sample Complexity of a Class of Fraction Queries
There already exist differentially private mechanisms for classes of fraction queries (e.g., the ones in [BLR08] and [DRV10] ). To use these mechanisms in Proposition 20, we will show that any class of fraction queries with low VC dimension has low sample complexity.
If the sampling in the definition of sample complexity were done with replacement as opposed to without replacement, then we could use known learning theory results to show that any class of fraction queries with low VC dimension has low sample complexity. However, the privacy guarantees of the above proposition rely on the fact that the sampling is done without replacement, since the proof uses Proposition 16, which needs this requirement. If the sampling is done with replacement, we are unable to achieve as good privacy parameters.
Our strategy is still to use known learning theory results, but we will adapt known proofs of the results as necessary so that we can use the results to show that any class of fraction queries with low VC dimension has low sample complexity, where the sampling is done without replacement.
A fraction query is a query q of the form q(D) =
, where D i is the i th row of the database D, and φ : X → {0, 1} is some predicate. Thus, a fraction query corresponds to some predicate, and for any class Q of fraction queries, we can consider the class Q of predicates that correspond to the fraction queries in Q.
We now review some terminology from learning theory. Let Q be any class of predicates, and let S be any finite subset of X. The restriction of Q to S, denoted Q| S , is the set {φ| S : S → {0, 1} | φ ∈ Q}, i.e., the set of restrictions to S of all predicates in Q. The growth function Π Q : N → N of Q is defined by Π Q (m) = max S ⊆X,|S |=m | Q| S |. We note that Π Q (m) ≤ 2 m for every m ∈ N, since for any finite S ⊆ X, there are only 2 |S | functions from S to {0, 1}.
We say that Q shatters S if | Q| S | = 2 |S| , i.e., for every predicate φ : S → {0, 1}, there exists a predicate φ ∈ Q such that φ | S = φ. The Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension (VC dimension) of Q is the size of the largest finite set S ⊆ X shattered by Q, or ∞ if the largest doesn't exist. Equivalently, the VC dimension of Q is the largest non-negative integer m such that Π Q (m) = 2 m , or ∞ if the largest doesn't exist. We note that if Q is finite, then the VC dimension of Q is at most log 2 | Q|, since if a finite set S ⊆ X is shattered by Q, then | Q| S | = 2 |S| , so Q must contain at least 2 |S| predicates.
For convenience, when we refer to the VC dimension of a class Q of fraction queries, we are actually referring to the VC dimension of the class Q of predicates that corresponds to Q. We now prove a lemma that describes how well k random samples chosen without replacement can simultaneously approximate a class of fraction queries. This lemma is similar to a known result in learning theory (e.g., see Theorem 4.3 in [AB99] ).
Lemma 21. Let Q be any class of fraction queries, and let Q be the corresponding class of predicates. Then, for every database D ∈ X n , α > 0, and k ≥ 0, we have
where the probability is over the choice of the database D formed by choosing k random samples without replacement from the database D. predicates φ 1 , . . . , φ t ∈ Q such that for any predicate φ ∈ Q, there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that
Let q 1 , . . . , q t be the fraction queries in Q that correspond to the predicates φ 1 , . . . , φ t . Then, for any fraction query q ∈ Q, there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that q( D ) = q i ( D ) and q( D ) = q i ( D ).
Thus, B occurs if and only if |q
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Then, by the union bound, we have the following:
Fix an i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. The above lemma gives an upper bound on the probability that k random samples (chosen without replacement) does not simultaneously approximate a class Q of fraction queries well, and the upper bound involves Π Q (2k). The following lemma gives an upper bound on Π Q (2k) in terms of the VC dimension of Q.
Lemma 22. Let Q be any class of predicates with finite VC dimension d ≥ 1. Then, for every
Proof. This lemma is a well-known result in learning theory and is a corollary of "Sauer's lemma", which states that for any class Q of predicates with finite
for all nonnegative integers m (e.g., see [Sau72] ). A proof of Sauer's lemma, as well as this lemma, can be found in [AB99] .
We can now combine Lemmas 21 and 22 to get the following proposition.
Proposition 23. Let Q be any class of fraction queries with finite VC dimension d ≥ 1. Then, for every n ≥ 1, k ≥ d/2, and β ∈ (0, 1], Q has (k, α, β)-sample complexity for databases of size n with the converter f (q, x) = x, where α =
. Also, for every n ≥ 1 and α, β ∈ (0, 1], Q has (k, α, β)-sample complexity for databases of size n with converter f (q, x) = x, where k is any non-negative integer satisfying k ≥ 
Thus, Q has (k, α , β)-sample complexity for databases of size n with converter f (q, x) = x, where We note that k ≥ d/2 still holds. Thus, from the argument above, to show that Q has (k, α, β)-sample complexity for databases of size n with converter f (q, x) = x, it suffices to show that
We now use the inequality ln a ≤ ab + ln 1 b − 1, which holds for all a, b > 0; this can be easily shown by using the inequality 1 + x ≤ e x (which holds for all x ∈ R), setting x to ab − 1, and rearranging the inequality. Applying the inequality ln a ≤ ab + ln 
Constructing Zero-Knowledge Private Mechanisms for a Class of Fraction Queries
Proposition 23 gives us a bound on the sample complexity of any class Q of fraction queries in terms of its VC dimension. Proposition 20 allows us to convert differentially private mechanism to zero-knowledge private mechanisms for any class of queries with low sample complexity. Thus, we now combine these two propositions with existing differentially private mechanisms for classes of fraction queries with low VC dimension. The following proposition is obtained by using the differentially private mechanism in [BLR08] .
Proposition 24. Let Q be any class of fraction queries with finite VC dimension d ≥ 1, and suppose the data universe X is finite. Let n ≥ 1 and , α, β ∈ (0, 1]. Then, for every integer
), there exists a mechanism San that is (α, β)-useful with respect to Q for databases of size n, and is 4k n -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Proof. By Proposition 23, Q has (k , We note that |f (q, x) − f (q, y)| ≤ 1 · |x − y| for every x, y ∈ R, q ∈ Q. Let San DP be thedifferentially private mechanism in [BLR08] that is ( ). (This result in [BLR08] actually assumes that X = {0, 1} d for some d , but as mentioned in the paper, the result can be easily extended to any finite set X.)
). Then, by Proposition 20, we can use San DP to construct a mechanism San ZK that is ( 4k n , 4k n δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) and is (α, β)-useful with respect to Q for databases of size n.
We now use the differentially private mechanism in [DRV10] to obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 25. Let Q be any finite class of fraction queries with finite VC dimension d ≥ 1, and suppose the data universe X is finite. Let n ≥ 1, ∈ (0, 1], and κ ≥ 1. Then, for every integer
), e −κ )-useful with respect to Q for databases of size n, and is ( 
). We note that |f (q, x) − f (q, y)| ≤ 1 · |x − y| for every x, y ∈ R, q ∈ Q. Let San DP be the ( , e −κ )-differentially private mechanism in [DRV10] that is (Õ(
1 2 e −κ )-useful with respect to Q for databases of size k.
Then, by Proposition 20, we can use San DP to construct a mechanism San ZK that is ( 4k n , 4k n δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) and is (Õ(
), e −κ )-useful with respect to Q for databases of size n.
In general, Propositions 23 and 20 can be used to convert useful differentially private mechanisms to useful zero-knowledge private mechanisms for classes of fraction queries with low VC dimension.
Recall that if Q is a finite class of fraction queries, then the VC dimension of Q is at most log 2 |Q|. Thus, we can replace the VC dimension d in Proposition 25 by log |Q| (we can also do this in Proposition 24 if we assume Q is finite). However, it is possible that the VC dimension of a class Q of fraction queries is substantially smaller than log 2 |Q| (e.g., see [AB99] ), especially if Q is infinite.
Zero-Knowledge Private Release of Graph Properties
In this section, we first generalize statistical (row) databases to graphs with personal data so that we can model a social network and privately release information that is dependent on the graph structure. We then discuss how to model privacy in a social network, and we construct a sample of zero-knowledge private mechanisms that release certain information about the graph structure of a social network.
We represent a social network using a graph whose vertices correspond to people (or other social entities) and whose edges correspond to social links between them, and a vertex can have certain personal data associated with it. There are various types of information about a social network one may want to release, such as information about the people's data, information about the structure of the social network, and/or information that is dependent on both. In general, we want to ensure privacy of each person's personal data as well as the person's links to other people (i.e., the list of people the person is linked to via edges).
To formally model privacy in social networks, let G n be a class of graphs on n vertices where each vertex includes personal data. (When we refer to a graph G ∈ G n , the graph always includes the personal data of each vertex.) The graph structure is represented by an adjacency matrix, and each vertex's personal data is represented by an element in X. For the privacy of individuals, we use our zero-knowledge privacy definition with some minor modifications:
• -zero-knowledge privacy is defined as before except we change "database D ∈ X n " to "graph D ∈ G n ", and we define (D −i , ⊥) to be the graph D except the personal data of vertex i is replaced by ⊥ and all the edges incident to vertex i are removed (by setting the corresponding entries in the adjacency matrix to 0); thus (D −i , ⊥) is essentially D with person i's personal data and links removed.
We now consider functions g : G n → R m , and we redefine the L 1 -sensitivity of g to be
We also redefine RS(k(·)) so that the algorithms in RS(k(·)) are given a graph D ∈ G n and are allowed to choose k(n) random vertices without replacement and read their personal data; however, the algorithms are not allowed to read the structure of the graph, i.e., the adjacency matrix. It is easy to verify that all our previous results still hold when we consider functions g : G n → R m on graphs and use the new definition of ∆(g) and RS(k(·)).
Since a social network has more structure than a statistical database containing a list of values, we now consider more general models of aggregate information that allow us to release more information about social networks:
• RSE(k(·), s) = k(·) random samples with exploration of s vertices: the class of algorithms T such that on input a graph D ∈ G n , T chooses k(n) random vertices uniformly with or without replacement (or a combination of both). For each sampled vertex v, T is allowed to explore the graph locally at v until s vertices (including the sampled vertex) have been visited. The data of any visited vertex can be read. (RSE stands for "random samples with exploration".) Note that these models of aggregate information include RS(k(·)) as a special case. We can also consider variants of these models where instead of allowing the data of any visited vertex to be read, only the data of the k(n) randomly chosen vertices can be read. (The data of the "explored" vertices cannot be read.)
Remark. In the above models, vertices (people) in the graph with high degree may be visited with higher probability than those with low degree. Thus, the privacy of these people may be less protected. However, this is often the case in social networks, where people with very many friends will naturally have less privacy than those with few friends.
We now show how to combine Proposition 12 (the connection between sample complexity and zero-knowledge privacy) with recent sublinear time algorithms to privately release information about the graph structure of a social network. For simplicity, we assume that the degree of every vertex is bounded by some constant d max (which is often the case in a social network anyway). 3 Let G n be the set of all graphs on n vertices where every vertex has degree at most d max . We assume that d max is publicly known. Let M = dmaxn 2 be an upper bound on the number of edges of a graph in G n . For any graph G ∈ G, the (relative) distance from G to the some property Π, denoted dist(G, Π), is the least number of edges that need to be modified (added/removed) in G in order to make it satisfy property Π, divided by M .
Theorem 26. Let Conn, Eul, and CycF be the property of being connected, Eulerian 4 , and cycle-3 Weaker results can still be established without this assumption. 4 A graph G is Eulerian if there exists a path in G that traverses every edge of G exactly once.
free, respectively. Letd(G) denote the average degree of a vertex in G. Let , δ > 0, and let K ∈ Z + . Then, for the class of graphs G n , we have the following results: 
The mechanism
Here, we further assume that δ ∈ (0, 1 2 ) and every graph in G has no isolated vertices and the average degree of a vertex is bounded by L.
The results of the above theorem are obtained by combining Proposition 12 (the connection between sample complexity and zero-knowledge privacy) with sublinear time algorithms from [MR09] (for results 1, 2, and 3) and [GR08] (for result 4). Intuitively, the sublinear algorithms give bounds on the sample complexity of the functions (dist(G, Conn), etc.) with respect to RSE(k(·), s) or RSN (k(·), d).
Proof.
Distance approximation to connectivity: Let San(G) = dist(G, Conn) + Lap(λ), where λ = 2/n+δ .
In [MR09] , Marko and Ron have given an algorithm that approximates the distance to connectivity to within an additive error δ with probability at least By running the above algorithm O(K) times and outputting the median value, we can increase the success probability to 1 − e −K . Thus, dist(G, Conn) has (δ, 1 − e −K ) sample complexity with respect to RSE(k(·), s), where k(n) = O( In [MR09] , Marko and Ron have given an algorithm that approximates the distance to being Eulerian to within an additive error δ with probability at least Distance approximation to cycle freeness: Let San(G) = dist(G, CycF )+Lap(λ), where λ = 2/n+δ .
In [MR09] , Marko and Ron have given an algorithm that approximates the distance to being cyclefree to within an additive error δ with probability at least Approximating the average degree of a graph: Let San(G) =d(G)+Lap(λ), where λ = 2dmax/n+δL .
In [GR08] , Goldreich and Ron have shown thatd(G) can be approximated by an algorithm (which needs the extra assumptions stated in the above theorem) to within a multiplicative error of (1 + δ) with probability at least 2 3 , by randomly choosing O( √ n log 2 n · 1 δ 9/2 log( 1 δ )) vertices, and for each chosen vertex, exploring the graph locally from the vertex up to a distance of 2. By running the approximation algorithm O(K) times and outputting the median value, we can increase the success probability to 1 − 2 −K .
Such an algorithm is a (δL, 1 − 2 −K )-sampler ford(G) with respect to RSN (k(·), 2), where There are already many (non-private) sublinear time algorithms for computing information about graphs whose accuracy is proved formally (e.g., see [GR08, CRT05, MR09, GR97, KKR04, GR98, PR02]) or demonstrated empirically (e.g, see [LF06, KFC + 05]). We leave for future work to investigate whether these (or other) sublinear algorithms can be used to get zero-knowledge private mechanisms.
Appendix A
Example (A more detailed explanation and analysis of the Democrats vs. Republicans example). Consider a a social network of n people that are grouped into cliques of size c. (For simplicity, assume that c divides n.) In each clique, either most people are Democrats, or most people are Republicans. To model this situation, we first let α ∈ [0, 0.2]. For each clique, we choose a number p in [0, α] ∪ [1 − α, 1] randomly and uniformly, and we decide that each person in the clique is a Democrat with probability p, or a Republican with probability 1 − p. This gives us a probability distribution over databases, each with a binary attribute X = {0, 1} and n rows, where each row states the political preference of a single person; a value of 1 represents Democrat, while a value of 0 represents Republican. Now, let g : X n → R n/c be the function that computes the proportion of Democrats in each clique. Let San be the mechanism that, on input a database D ∈ X n , first computes g(D) and then adds Lap( is -differentially private, so for small , one may think that it is safe to release such information without violating the privacy of any particular person. That is, the released data should not allow us to guess correctly with probability significantly greater than 1/2 whether a particular person is a Democrat or a Republican. However, this is not the case. To see this, suppose we know which clique some person i is in. We look at the data released by San to obtain the noisy proportionp for the clique person i is in. Ifp ≥ 0.5, we guess that person i's clique mostly consists of Democrats, so we guess that person i is a Democrat; otherwise, we guess that person i's clique mostly consists of Republicans, so we guess that person i is a Republican. Since San adds Lap( −α)c )(1 − α) ≈ 0.799. This is significantly higher than 0.5 · e = 0.5 · e 0.1 ≈ 0.553, which one might think is supposed to be an upper bound on the probability that our guess is correct, since San satisfies -differential privacy with = 0.1 (see the appendix in [DMNS06] ; the 0.5 comes from guessing randomly). With = 0.01, α = 0.2, and c = 200, our guess for person i is correct with probability at least (1 − −α)c )(1 − α) ≈ 0.580. This is still a lot higher than 0.5 · e = 0.5 · e 0.01 ≈ 0.505.
